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Abstract
The prolific integration of technology into medical
environments is continuously generating new attack
vectors. This continuous amalgamation of technology
into the medical field prompted the idea that risk
assessment models can be utilized to identify cyber
security vulnerabilities in medical settings. This
research presents an initial investigation into the
application of risk assessment frame works, i.e.,
STRIDE, Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures, and
a Common Vulnerability Scoring System to identified
networked medical devices that are currently employed
in an operational medical simulation lab. The
contribution of this research is twofold and culminates
in a novel proof-of-concept system known as
MedDevRisk. First, it demonstrates an approach to
incorporating existing threat models into a relational
database schema based on Threat-Vulnerability-Asset
(TVA) relationships. Second, it provides an initial
empirical analysis of the risk associated with
networked medical devices along with providing the
foundation for future research.

1. Introduction
In today’s world, medical devices have transitioned
from isolated, stand-alone systems into networked
medical devices that are heavily dependent on
software. In 2013, Alemzadeh et al. [1] discerned a
70% increase in medical device recalls reported to the
United States Food and Drug Administration (FDA)
along with a 103% increase in adverse events between
2006 and 2011. The authors also noted that 23% of all
medical device recalls were computer-related failures,
which include any malfunction of the device’s
hardware, software, input, output, or battery.
Complicating matters, many medical devices
contain and transmit patient data to other devices and
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network servers [2], which levies the requirement on
organizations and manufacturers to protect such data in
transit and at rest [2, 3]. The use of software in a
networked environment also opens the risk for
malware to infect computers that control medical
devices [4]. Due to the reliance on medical devices and
control software, many new vulnerabilities are being
introduced into patient care environments, with
consequences of compromise ranging from loss of
essential equipment necessary to treat patients, to data
integrity being violated [5].
Healthcare organizations that use and manage
medical devices face potential problems if outdated or
unsupported software is not kept updated on a regular
basis.
Likewise, knowing which preventative
measures to apply so that risk will be mitigated longterm is typically left to the expertise or experience of
the network administrators and information technology
(IT) staff [2, 5, 6]. Such variability can pose severe
problems in safety critical environments, like medical
devices, which require constant contact while in
service [7]. Current research also indicates that there
are risks associated with networked medical devices
that could, potentially, lead to further patient injury or
even death, if unresolved [8]. This is further
highlighted by academic activity investigating ways to
compromise surgical environments [9] along with the
development of solutions that integrate forensic
principles into the design and development of Medical
Cyber-Physical Systems [10].
In order to address the need for actionable threat
assessment criteria for healthcare organizations to
govern the use of medical devices on their networks,
this research poses a novel framework known as
MedDevRisk with the following key features: 1) use of
a relational data model capturing medical device
threats, assets, and vulnerabilities, 2) use of
conventional risk assessment standards, and 3) data
from a real-world health-related organization. This
framework provides a relational integration of network
device information with their attendant security threats
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and potential remediation steps. The consolidation of
these data provide underlying relationships which can
answer risk assessment questions pertinent to both
lower-level administrators and higher level managers
that make decisions on money and resources.
The remainder of the paper is structured in the
following manner. Section two provides background
on risk modeling along with relevant related work.
Section three elaborates on the fundamental
motivations and assumptions associated with the
development methodology. Section four highlights key
features of the framework implementation and section
five provides conclusions and plans for future work.

2. Background and Related Work
The continued amalgamation of technology into the
medical field raises concerns about risk and how that
risk is perceived in a medical context [9, 11, 12].
Pairing the growing concerns about risk with the
impact that residual data appears to have, in legal
context, serves to escalate interest in risk mitigation
solutions [13-15]. Hence, this interest has prompted
previous work in databases and proposed frameworks
[16, 17] for assessing risk.

2.1. Governing Organizations and Law
The U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) is
responsible for the protection of the public’s health by
regulating the medical device safety and security [18].
In 2013, the FDA released the Content of Premarket
Submissions for Management of Cybersecurity in
Medical Devices concerning how manufacturers and
the healthcare industry should approach cybersecurity
in medical devices [18]. The FDA guidelines require
lists of cybersecurity risks, controls, countermeasures,
and instructions for medical devices from the
manufacturers. In the United States, the healthcare
industry must implement the Health Insurance
Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA),
which mandates the privacy of protected health
information of patients by covering information
privacy, information security, and standardization of
data [19]. Though most of the healthcare industry
already has problems ensuring good practices, there are
information security issues, such as vulnerable
networks, that frequently remain overlooked [19].

damage to an asset [20]. Risk is, commonly, calculated
as a combination of the probability that an adverse
event will occur and the impact (severity), if the event
actually does occur. Overall, the entire objective of
security is essentially risk prevention through the
removal of vulnerabilities and preventing threat agents
from endangering assets [20]. Hence, risk assessment
and analysis encompass methods for the categorization
and distribution of information concerning the security
risks related to the organization’s infrastructure [21]. A
risk assessment, as defined by the National Institute of
Standards and Technology (NIST), is a “process of
identifying, estimating, and prioritizing information
security risks” [22, 23]. Brown [24] agrees and
expands this definition to include cultivating mitigation
strategies. Gerber’s research [25] concluded that after
completing a risk analysis, security controls can
effectively decrease risks. Ultimately, risk analysis
should result in greater protection for technologyrelated assets and data. Yue et al. [26] further state that
security risk management has developed into a crucial
obligation for IT managers and staff. Thus, the
MedDevRisk framework derives its inspiration from
the need to provide relevant risk assessment for health
and health-care related organizations.

2.3. Conventional Risk Models
MedDevRisk leverages several nomenclatures
promoted by Microsoft and MITRE that are in
common use in government and industry. These
include the STRIDE threat model, Common
Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE), and the
Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS). The
STRIDE threat model (Figure 1) is a mnemonic that
categorizes threats into spoofing, tampering,
repudiation, information disclosure, denial of service,
and elevation of privileges [27, 28]. According to
Shostack [28], each of the six threat classifications are
attack methods that could exploit the components of
information assurance and each has an attendant
security property that would address the threat. The
STRIDE model is used extensively as part of
Microsoft’s Security Development Lifecycle (SDL) to
help define the attack surface [27, 28].

2.2. Risk Assessment
The tacit understanding of risk is the possibility that
a vulnerability will be exploited by a threat to cause

Figure 1. STRIDE threat model.
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CVE is a public dictionary created by the MITRE
Corporation that encompasses a collection of known
information security vulnerabilities and exposures with
the purpose of offering common identifiers for
cybersecurity threats [29]. CVSS is a risk assessment
framework for modeling cybersecurity vulnerabilities
quantitatively, in addition to providing impact scores
based on three metric groups: base, temporal, and
environmental exposures [30]. The CVSS model is
presented in Figure 2. These standard nomenclatures
and models provide a real-world context for how the
MedDevRisk framework formulates and presents risk
assessment evaluations.

maintenance. Users that are considered in the
published evaluation of MeDRa include nurses, allied
health professionals, consultants, and other medical
staff. The MeDRa tool outputs a medical device risk
assessment report and a mitigation plan as raw data in
Microsoft Excel.
Brown’s [24] major finding focused on how the use
of the risk assessments, compiled from feedback from
healthcare professionals and analyzed using statistical
methods, compared to the Australian Risk Standard.
The official risk ratings for most devices are defined as
very low, whereas the results from the MeDRa tool and
analysis proved that the devices could potentially have
a higher risk rating. According to Brown [24], the
major limitation of the MeDRa study is that risks
identified by healthcare professionals could be biased
[24]. In contrast, the MedDevRisk framework utilizes
CVE and CVSS nomenclature as the qualitative basis
for assigning vulnerability exposures and scores.
While there is research in the broader area of risk
assessments that utilize relational databases, minimal
research exists that successfully integrates multiple risk
models into a database framework using real-world
data. The MedDevRisk framework brings these key
features together into a unified context.

3. Methodology

Figure 2. CVSS metric groups [30].

2.4. MeDRa
One of the few published frameworks that
evaluates medical device risk is documented by Brown
[24]. His electronic medical devices risk assessment
tool (MeDRa) is healthcare environment centric.
MeDRa creates a risk profile for each device
classification and each potential device setting that is
connected to an intranet. Device assessment in MeDRa
is based on clinical environment usage. For example, a
medical device that is frequently used in large hospitals
by well-trained staff has a lower risk value than the
same medical device that is not commonly used in
smaller environments [21]. The risk referenced in
Brown’s research is based on the Australian Standard
As/NzS4360, statistical analysis, and risk observations
as defined by healthcare professionals. In primary
contrast to our proposed framework, MeDRa creates a
risk assessment for each medical device based on user
responses from a series of yes/no questions concerning
organizational communication and culture, staff skills
and knowledge, device operation and use, and device

In order to investigate the key features of the
MedDevRisk framework, this research conducted a
case study as defined by Yin [31] and discussed by
Oates [32]. The following approach was implemented
to identify real-world risks faced by medical and health
organizations based on their networked medical
devices.
1. Schema Selection: A database schema was
selected from prior work, modified to utilize
several security nomenclatures and implemented.
2. Normalization: The selected database schema
was then examined for normalization.
3. Data Acquisition: A list of medical devices was
acquired from the College of Nursing HumanPatient Simulation Unit at the University of South
Alabama (USA).
4. Schema Adaptation: The database was examined
for appropriate tables, columns, rows, and data
fields. It was then expanded, where necessary.
5. Threat Model Categorization: Threat models
were applied to categorize the data. This paper
reports only the STRIDE model integration.
6. Asset Data Entry: The data acquired from the
simulation lab was entered into the database to
populate assets.
7. Vulnerability Categorization: The models were
then applied to identify vulnerabilities.
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8.

View Generation: The database was then
modified to create schema views to support
multiple levels of query.
9. Vulnerability Data Entry: The vulnerabilities
were then input into the database.
10. Query Development: Queries were then
developed to highlight vulnerabilities that targeted
two managerial perspectives: low-level IT
managers of technology and high-level decision
makers like CTOs, CISOs, and CIOs.
11. Result Analysis: The queries were executed and
the results were collected for analysis.
Figure 3 diagrams the flow of the MedDevRisk
framework and its components. More specifically, the
flow diagram illustrates how the database schemas,
threat models, the case study data collected from the
simulation unit and any additional research ties into the
flow of the new database and its outputs. As noted in
the data relationships portion of Figure 3, the STRIDE
threat model and use of the National Vulnerability
Database (NVD) risk data may be included as part of
the inclusion of existing threat modelling techniques
into the database.

a threat-vulnerability-asset (TVA) model using
healthcare-related threats and countermeasures. As a
proof-of-concept, the authors populated a relational
database with hypothetical data involving security
vulnerabilities in healthcare.
Pardue et al.’s [16] schema, as seen in Figure 4,
was based on the TVA model and included entities
such as threat, vulnerability, asset, control, threat
source, cause, and domain. They organized threats by
ranking how much risk is associated with a particular
threat. They extracted data through the use of the
structured query language (SQL) to manipulate the
data and execute queries to identify threats, controls
and countermeasures. As a proof-of-concept model,
their solution formed pertinent risk assessment
outcomes using query capabilities. In Cerkovnik’s
unpublished thesis work [17], the TVA-based approach
proposed by Pardue et al. [16] was investigated as a
potential framework for integrating various threat and
vulnerability data associated with medical devices.
This study collected a small data sample from various
sources including the Manufacturer and User Facility
Device Experience (MAUDE) database [33], the FDA
Medical Product Safety Network (MedSun) [34],
Shodan [35], and FDA’s 510(k) database Pre-Market
Notification database [36].

Figure 4. Base TVA schema [15].

Figure 3. MedDevRisk framework.

3.1. Schema Selection and Normalization
The MedDevRisk relational framework builds upon
the work of Pardue et al. [16], which uses a databasedriven approach to assess risk. This work implemented

Although Cerkovnik’s [17] work provided an
experimental basis for how to tailor the TVA approach
for specific medical terminology and categories, the
resulting schema was independent from the base TVA
relationships. As our contribution, the MedDevRisk
framework and database (seen in Figure 5) provides a
unifying schema with new tables, fields, underlying
views, underlying queries, and context-specific
relationships that captures a broader set of features for
analyzing risk in medical devices. For instance, two
new tables were added to the initial schema in order to
normalize the database and include new categories of
medical devices, i.e. tblDevice and tblInventory.
The new tblDevice table is connected to the risk
assessment database using a one-to-many relationship
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to tblAsset. Because the attributes in the table tblAsset
is composed of general terms used for cyber assets or
devices (e.g. an operating system, smart phone, or
electronic patient health record), “Medical Devices”
was inserted, as a new item, into the tblAsset. The
AssetID field is used to categorize the types of
devices, whether it is the server, router, laptop, or
medical device.
The device table, tblDevice, was created to hold
cyber asset data types so that multiple devices could be
associated with any type of asset. For instance, an
electrocardiogram and a defibrillator are both medical
device assets, but would be listed as separate devices in
the tblDevice table. The table tblDevice contains
attributes related to the types of the devices and the
descriptions of those devices.
In addition to tblDevice, a new table was created
that is designed to contain the location and the actual
device’s specific information for individual devices
called tblInventory. This table is used for each device
that is on-site in the facility and can account for
multiple devices of the same type of device. The idea is
that each facility or hospital could have more than one
of the same type of device, such as multiple laptops or
multiple patient monitors.

3.2. Data Acquisition
To validate and exercise the enhanced relational
schema, an experimental case study was performed
based on the collection of real-world data from the
USA’s School of Nursing, Human–Patient Simulation
Program. The Simulation Unit contains high-quality
medical simulators and devices used for realistic
training in healthcare clinical scenarios. These
scenarios are used to train future doctors, nurses, and
healthcare professionals. They are also routinely used
to assist with continuing education efforts for
practitioners.
The USA Simulation Unit provided a list of
networked medical devices. The list of medical devices
was, initially, evaluated and three networked medical
devices were input into the relational database model.
The devices selected include LifeSync Wireless
Electrocardiogram (ECG) Systems, Physio-Control
LIFEPAK Defibrillators, and Laerdal VitalSim Vital
Signs
Simulators.
The
LifeSync
Wireless
Electrocardiogram (ECG) System transmits ECG
signals and patient data wirelessly from the patient to
the ECG monitor. The LifeSync Wireless System uses
“a radio-frequency signal transmitter and receiver of
diagnostic electrocardiographic physiological signals
which are displayed on the ECG monitors of various
manufacturers’ systems” [37]. A Physio-Control
LIFEPAK Defibrillator is a wireless acute cardiac care

response system in a single, portable device. Each of
medical device type in the device list has at least one
model number and may be listed on the list more than
once (i.e., multiple devices in inventory).

3.3. Schema Adaptation
Based on the starting TVA schema, three specific
adaptations were chosen that extend the core entities
based on their relevance to risk assessment and
availability of current data: 1) Threat: Applied SQL
views using STRIDE; 2) Vulnerability: Applied SQL
views using NVD (CVE/CVSS/CWE); and 3) Asset:
Modified database to include device-specific data.
Existing threat and vulnerability frameworks were
integrated into the relational database model, including
the STRIDE [27] threat model, Common
Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) [29], Common
Weakness Enumeration (CWE), and Common
Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) [30].
The STRIDE model [27] is the threat categorization
model applied towards the threat component of the
TVA-based relational database. CVE [29], which is a
cybersecurity vulnerability identifier, and CVSS [30],
which is a risk assessment of the CVE cybersecurity
vulnerabilities, are the vulnerability threat modeling
techniques and resources applied to the vulnerability
component of the database. The National Vulnerability
Database (NVD) provides the CVSS for CVE entries.
To account for assets in the TVA model, the asset
component of the relational database was expanded by
adding the device and inventory tables. The table
tblDevice plays another role as well. Each CVE and
CVSS reflects the vulnerabilities and risk score of
medical devices, this information is recorded in
tblDevice.
Device vulnerabilities were identified using reports,
manuals, and U.S. Government resources such as FDA
MedSun reports [34] and the National Vulnerability
Database [38]. To reduce complexity in the database,
SQL views are used to pull the attributes needed from
tables to model threats. This allows the examination of
the data through a diverse threat model lens.

3.4. Threat Model Categorization
In order to support threat assessment, each category
of the STRIDE threat model was researched in order to
assign threat actions appropriately. Each threat was
classified by two STRIDE categories based directly on
the ThreatCategoryID and the ThreatAction.
Two primary threat actions that were used include 1)
“Disclose Patient Health Information”, which is
directly related to information disclosure in STRIDE,
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and 2) “Manipulate Patient Health Information”, which
is tampering in STRIDE.

STRIDE categories were created based on attacker
motivation and threat actions: 1) STRIDE_
Motivation relates what happened to the data or the
motivation for the threat, i.e. whether disclosure or data
manipulation was in view, and 2) STRIDE_Action
relates how the threat happened or what action
occurred, e.g. Man-in-the-Middle attack or IP
Spoofing. One type of threat action (SQL Injection
attacks) covered more than two STRIDE categories.
This attack affects Spoofing, Tampering, Repudiation,
Information Disclosure, and Elevation of Privilege
[39]. The attacker could potentially steal an identity,
remove logs, change their privileges, or perform data
leakage and alteration. Figure 6 provides a partial view
of STRIDE categories.

Figure 6. STRIDE view mapping.

3.5. Asset Data Entry
A SQL Server database was used to implement the
MedDevRisk schema, associated views, and queries.
The database was populated with the network medical
devices from the Human-Patient Simulation Unit. The
list contains ten (10) different types of medical devices,
a total of twenty-seven (27) different models of the
types of medical devices collectively, and a total of
forty-five (45) medical devices in inventory. Of the ten
(10) different types of medical devices, eight (8)
devices are high-fidelity or medium-fidelity medical
simulators. High-fidelity medical device examples
include the CAE iStan Adult Simulators and the
Gaumard Noelle Birthing Simulators, which are fullsized, wireless adult medical mannequins. The other
two types of medical devices are electrocardiograms
and defibrillators.
Device-specific data for tblDevice was collected
using manufacturer reports, user manuals, and
technical specification sheets issued by the
manufacturer. The collected data was then matched to
appropriate attributes in tblDevice for each device.
Rows were inserted into tblInventory for each item by
serial number. Identified vulnerabilities and CVSS
Metric values from NVD Vulnerability Summaries for
CVEs for each device were also matched to the
tblVulnerability attributes [30, 38].
Figure 5. MedDevRisk database schema.
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3.6. Vulnerability Categorization & Entry
In addition to device manuals, user guides, and
technical specifications released by the manufacturer,
the following online resources were utilized to collect
device-specific data and vulnerabilities: FDA
MAUDE, FDA Medical Product Safety Network (FDA
MedSun), Shodan, FDA’s 510(k) Pre-Market
Notification database, FDA Recalls, and the NVD,
which contains information for CVE, CVSS, and
CWE. Vulnerability data was inserted into
tblVulnerability for each device for a total of 31
vulnerabilities. The AssetID for Medical Devices and
the ThreatDomainID for Healthcare was used for all
vulnerability entries.
For each vulnerability, at least one potential threat
action was identified. For each threat action, potential
controls were identified that could be implemented as
mitigation
strategies.
Each
combination
of
vulnerability type, threat action, and control received
its own vulnerability entry in tblVulnerability.
Additionally, some vulnerabilities were identified that
could be exploited by different threat sources: a
human-deliberate insider, human-deliberate outsider,
or human unintentional insider. If a vulnerability had
more than one threat source, it was listed multiple
times.
Often, one attribute affected another. For example,
if a human-unintentional insider exploits the Laerdal
VitalSim Vital Signs Simulator’s vulnerability by
disclosing health information through the extraction of
data through a USB drive, the main control is
identified as educating the Medical Staff about the
severity, consequences, fines and penalties related to a
data breach. However, if the same vulnerability is
exploited by a human-deliberate insider, by using
malware to attack the device through a USB drive, then
more evasive controls should be implemented, such as
applying security patches and software updates.

3.7. View Generation
SQL VIEWs were developed to extract relevant
data from tblVulnerability and to provide renaming of
attributes to match our acquired CVE, CVSS, and
CWE data. Essentially, the same database data is
examined differently using multiple vulnerability and
risk assessment frameworks. Similarly to the data
insertion process, the database attributes were
translated into NVD-based attributes that focused on
CVE and CVSS values.
The National Vulnerability Database (NVD)
provides the CVSS for CVE entries and includes the
CWE into each Vulnerability Summary for the CVE.

The NVD Vulnerability Summary for a CVE was
applied to the database using SQL VIEWs. CVEs were
then searched for that included networked medical
devices in the vulnerability database using search terms
like medicine, medical device, insulin pump, infusion
pump, defibrillator, and pacemaker.
As a result, we found a total of eight (8) CVEs for
infusion pumps (e.g. Hospira LifeCare PCA Infusion
System), five (5) CVEs for insulin pumps (e.g. Johnson
& Johnson Animas OneTouch Ping and Medtronic
Paradigm wireless insulin pump), two (2) CVEs for
pacemakers (pacemaker management system), and two
(2) CVEs for defibrillators (e.g. ZOLL Defibrillator).
Examining multiple CVE examples online allowed
for the translation of the CVE data into our database
from metrics into table attributes. The following
vulnerability attributes were identified from the CVE
data: Vulnerability Type ID, Threat Action
ID, Threat Domain ID, Threat Source ID, and
Scenario.
Relevant information from the Scenario attribute
was included in tblVulnerability as a baseline.
ControlIDs were then selected based on the identified
vulnerabilities
and
threats.
For
instance,
countermeasures were identified that should be
implemented to aid in prevention of a future
application-layer or denial of service attacks, such as
inspecting database traffic and implementing network
precautions.
CVSS data in the NVD entry were used to identify
the impact values for the device and decided how to
implement the values in tblVulnerability in the
database. Based on the CVSS data in the Impact
section of the NVD entry, the following
tblVulnerability attributes were identified: Riskiness,
Likelihood, Attacker Motivation, Attack
Difficulty, Impact, and Explanation. The
Explanation
attributes
contains
additional
descriptions of impact metrics such as Access
Vector, Access Complexity, Authentication,
and Impact Type.
After determining vulnerability values to insert into
the database for testing, SQL INSERT queries were
written to insert the vulnerability data into
tblVulnerability. Because tblVulnerability does not
contain device-specific attributes and only contains an
AssetID, the device’s name, manufacturer, and model
number(s) that apply to the vulnerability in the
Scenario attribute were included. To link the
Vulnerability ID to a Device ID, a LIKE
expression is used in the WHERE clause to match the
Device Name, Manufacturer, and Model Number
to the vulnerability.
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3.8. Query Development
SQL queries were written to retrieve the case study
networked medical devices and highlight each
networked medical device’s vulnerabilities using the
TVA Model, the STRIDE Threat Model, and the NVD
Vulnerability Summary for CVEs. For the STRIDE
model and NVD framework, SQL VIEWs were
utilized to select data.
An SQL query that focuses on the STRIDE
categories was developed to highlight the
vulnerabilities of our case study medical devices.
STRIDE was implemented by selecting the Threat
Action ID first, the STRIDE Action categories
second, the STRIDE Motivation categories third,
the description of the Threat Action fourth, and the
device-related attributes fifth. Then, additional
attributes from tblVulnerability like riskiness,
likelihood and impact were included in the query.

related threat actions. The main Risk Assessment
Report combines all threat risk modeling and
vulnerability frameworks that were incorporated into
the database. A Risk Assessment Report is provided in
Figure 8.

Figure 7. Database values to NVD values.

4. MedDevRisk Result Analysis
The research successfully identified existing
relational database-driven system research, originally
proposed by Pardue et al. [16], that could be modified
and expanded for the purposes of integrating a
prioritized risk mitigation strategy for networked
medical devices. In the expanded system, attributes
were selected using a ranking methodology to organize
the threats, to assess the risk of a threat, and prioritize
resources as part of the risk assessment. Threat risk
modeling and vulnerability frameworks were
successfully incorporated into the risk assessment by
using our STRIDE and CVE VIEWs. The results of the
implementation for the STRIDE view are presented in
Figure 6.
A proof-of-concept case-study, using real-world
data from a practicing medical simulation training unit
was successfully implemented using the developed
model. The reports generated, as a result of the case
study, contain a ranked list of medical devices and
associated vulnerabilities. Specialized SQL queries and
views were initially developed to conveniently access
information from multiple perspectives and then they
were implemented in reports. Figure 7 provides a
sample view of the mapping between NVD reported
vulnerability scores and database specific fields where
risk score, impact, and likelihood are tied together.
The MedDevRisk framework provides ability to
directly tie reported vulnerability risk scores from
CVSS rankings directly into reporting features. The
SQL queries for the Risk Assessment reports focus on
a list of devices with each device’s CVSS Metrics,
vulnerability data, and STRIDE categorizations of the

Figure 8. MedDevRisk risk assessment report.
The SQL queries for the Mitigation Report contain
a list of ranked controls by number of vulnerabilities, a
list of medical devices matched to their controls, and a
list of controls and devices ranked by CVSS Metrics to
determine the order of implementation. The final
Mitigation Report is organized by device and contains
ranked controls per device by CVSS Metrics.
Therefore, a total of five reports was created. An
example of a Mitigation report is provided in Figure 9.

Figure 9. MedDevRisk mitigation report.
Three specialized Risk Assessment Reports were
then created that reflect the TVA Model, STRIDE
Model, and NVD Summary for CVEs were created
during the course of this research. An example of a
STRIDE report is available in Figure 10. The report
presents each device on a separate page, provides the
STRIDE Motivation, the STRIDE Action, ranked
vulnerability risk, NVD-Based and STRIDE Data
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5. Conclusions and Future Work
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